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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
A.. H. HODGES,
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.

Case No. 8018

. EVANDER L. WAITE, also known as
E. L. WAITE,
Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT.. :~.

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for
the County of Cache, Utah.

Honorable Lewis Jones, District Jndge

NEWEL G. DAINES,
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant.
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
A. H. HODGES,
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.

Case No. 8018

EV ANDER L. \V AITE, also known as
E. L. WAITE,
Defendant and Appellant

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a Judgment on the verdict in
the Plaintiff's favor, rendered in a suit for damages brought
by A. N. Hodges, vs. Evander L. Waite, also known as
E. L. Waite.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was negligent in an
automobile collision and the Defendant's defense was that
the Plaintiff's negligence was the approximate cause of the
collision and in Defendant's Cross-Complaint claimed that
the Plaintiff's negligence was the sole cause of the collision
and prayed for damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The pertinent facts in this case are as follows: Defendant had been hunting on the 20th day of October,
19.51, up Temple Fork, in Logan Canyon. Temple Fork
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being on the east side of the Logan-Bear Lake Highway.
He was driving a pick-up truck and pulling a two-wheeled
cattle trailer behind. He was unable to load his horse on
the trailer until he reached the main Logan-Bear Lake
Highway where the accident occurred at 6:30 p. m., and
the sun sets at said place at .5:32p.m. (Tr. 27).
As Defendant came on the Logan Canyon Highway
where Temple Fork Road intersects the said highway he
crossed over to the west side and went down said highway
sixty-five feet at which point he stopped and proceeded
to load his horse on to the trailer. ( Tr. 102).
There was no dispute in the testimony as to the sixtyfive feet. (Tr. 138). The Logan-Bear Lake Highway
at this point runs in a northeasterly and southwesterly
direction about seventeen miles from Logan. The oiled
portion of the highway at this point is twenty feet wide
with a two-foot shoulder on the west and a six or seven
foot shoulder on the east, niaking a twenty-eight foot
road. (Tr. 52, and 57). The east wheels of Defendant's
outfit were about three and a half feet on the tarred surface of the road and the west wheels were on the shoulder.
Plaintiff was coming down the Canyon road in his
truck, using dimmer lights and traveling from 30 to 35
miles per hour. He testified that he could see only forty
to fifty feet in front of him, and ran into the Defendant's
truck and trailer. (Tr. 3-41-43-63). Plaintiff testified that
he had been in the trucking business for many years and
was familiar with this particular Canyon road. Plaintiff's
testimony was that traveling 30 miles per hour he could
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not stop his truck in less than seventy-nine feet ( Tr. 148)
and his visibility in using dimmer lights was limited to
forty to fifty feet in front of him. Plaintiff also testified
that there was plenty of room on the road for him to have
gone around the east side of Defendant's outfit, had he
seen the trailer and truck in time. ( Tr. 52). Plaintiff
testified that there was a straightaway about 400 to 500
feet at this point and the road is plainly visible for that
distance, also if flares were placed on the road, they would
be visible up and down the road for said distance. ( Tr.
20). If flares could be seen for that distance on the road
why weren't the truck and trailer also visible to the plaintiff for the same distance. Plaintiff testified that he did
not sound his horn at any time. (Tr. 44).
Eugene Waite, the son of the Defendant, who was
helping load the horse, testified that the truck and trailer
were parked sixty-five feet down from the Temple Fork
intersection. ( Tr. 82). The trailer and truck are five
and a half feet wide and about three and a half feet of this
width was the oiled road. ( Tr. 83). There were cars coming
down the road prior to the Plaintiff's truck and Eugene
Waite was flagging with his flashlight to warn the passing
cars. (Tr. 84, 85 and 97). Anyone could see up the road
from where the truck and trailer were parked a distance
of 450 feet, (Tr. 86) and the road was straight for a
distance of 200 feet. (Tr. 135). The road was plainly
visible for a distance of 250 feet down from the scene of
the accident.
The defendant testified that he pulled down the main
highway sixty-five fpet from the Temple Fork intersection
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and parked on the west side of the road (Tr. 102 and 108)
with his tail light burning on the left side of the truck.
( Tr. 107 ) . When the collision occurred the Plaintiff's
truck pushed the Defendant's outfit down the road a
distance of seventy feet, (Tr. 110) causing damage to the
trailer in the sum of $200.00 and to the truck the sum of
$7 4.00. The Defendant testified that due to the muddy
condition of the Temple Fork road, it was impossible for
him to load the horse on to the trailer until they reached
the Logan-Bear Lake Highway. (Tr. 113).
Deputy Sheriff Thomas J. Rowley} at the time of the
trial, went into the canyon and measured the distance from
the Temple Fork intersection down to a point sixty-five
feet (Tr. 154) and testified that at this point he could see
up the road a distance of 200 feet. Thomas Rowley further testified that you could see a cow, deer or a trailer
200 feet up the road from where the accident occurred.
( Tr. 155, 156 and 157).
Harry L. Ashcroft also testified that he helped to
measure a distance of 500 feet up the road from the site
of the accident and that a truck was visible for that distance. There was a straightaway at this point in the road
of 200 feet from the site of the accident. ( Tr. 139 and
140).
Plaintiff rested. Defendant made a motion for directed verdict against the Plaintiff on the grounds that he
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, on
the grounds that Plaintiff was not driving within the range
of his lights; that he failed to keep a proper look-out; that
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he did not sound his horn; that he did not have his truck
under control for the existing conditions; that he was
traveling on dimmers with a visibility of forty to fifty feet
and that he could not stop his truck in less than a distance
of seventy-nine feet. The Court denied Defendant's
motion. Defendant renewed his motion at the end of the
trial and requested Instruction Number 5 against the
Paintiff, but the Court refused to grant said Instruction.
Defendant took exception to this refusal. Again Defendant
made motion for Judgment nothwithstanding the verdict
or in the alternative, motion for new trial, claiming that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law, which said motion was again denied by the Court.
Defendant maintains that each one of the aforesaid
motions should have been granted and that it was an error
for the Court to deny the said motions and that the jury's
verdict was not supported by the evidence.
It is Defendant's contention from the above evidence
that Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law and the Court committed error in refusing
to grant any and all of the aforesaid motions.

POINT NO.1
The Court erred in denying Defendant's motions for
directed verdict.
POINT NO.2
The Court erred in denying Defendant's motion for
Judgment nothwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative motion for a new trial.
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POINT NO.3
The Court committed error in refusing to grant Defendant's requested Instruction Number .5.
ARGUMENT OF POINTS ONE, TWO, AND THREE
The argument of Points No.1, No.2, and No.3 will be
made together inasmuch as the evidence and the law
governing points are about the same.
The evidence produced by the Plaintiff clearly established as a matter of law that Plaintiff's contributory negligence was the approximate cause of the accident. The
trial Court committed error in denying all motions. The all
controlling case in this matter is Nikoleropoulos vs.
Ramsey, 214 Pacific 304, in which it held that it was negligence for a person to drive an automobile on a public
street at such a rate of speed that it cannot be stopped
within the distance at which the operator is able to see
objects on the street in front of him. The same rule of
law was followed in the Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy
Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 Pacific 2nd 309, and in
'Vright, vs. Maynard 235 Pacific 2nd 916.
Plaintiff testified that he was coming down the LoganBear Lake Highway in his truck, more than thirty minutes
after sundown, using his dimmer lights and was traveling
from 30 to 35 miles per hour. He could only see forty to
fifty feet in front of his truck. (Tr. 3-41-43 and 63).
Plaintiff's testimony was that when traveling thirty miles
per hour he could not stop his truck in less than seventynine feet (Tr. 148) and at 35 miles per he could not stop
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in less· distance than ninety feet. He also testified that
there was plenty of room on the road for him to have gone
around c,n the east side of Defendant's outfit if he had seen
the trailer and tnlCk in time. It therefore follows that the
reason this accident was not avoided was on account of the
fact that the Plaintiff did not have proper vision and could
not see far enough ahead at the rate of speed he was traveling in order to have avoided the accident.
Session Laws of Utah, 1949, 57-7-196 which is as follows and was in effect at the time of this accident: (d)
"The lowermost beams shall be so aimed and of sufficient
intensity to reveal a person or vehicle at a distance of at
least 100 feet ahead." The statute also requires that the upper lights of the motor vehicles should be such as to reveal
persons and vehicles at a distance of 350 feet ahead. There
is no dispute as to the aforesaid evidence as it was produced by the Plaintiff. From the testimony of the Plaintiff
the lights of his automobile did not meet the requirements
of the said statute and he could only see from forty to fifty
feet ahead of him. There are many cases that hold that
violation of a traffic law constitutes negligence as a matter
of law. It was held in Shimizer vs. Kurtz, 11 Pacific 2nd
1 that failure to have lights on an automobile conforming
to the requirements of the motor vehicle code was of itself
negligence. This same rule is also followed in Pollard vs.
Whitman 183 Pacific 2nd 175; 28 Washington 2nd 367.
According to the testimony of Sheriff Thomas J.
Rowley, Eugene Waite, Harry L. Ashcroft and the defendant, a vehicle, at the place of the accident could be plainly
seen for a distance of at least 200 feet up the road and at
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least 200 feet down the road. If the plaintiff had been
using the proper lights and keeping a proper lookout and
had not been negligent, no accident would have occured.
Plaintiff testified that he did not sound his horn at
any time, (Tr. 44), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, .57-7-171
reads as follows:
DRIVING IN CANYONS AND ON MOUNTAIN
HIGHWAYS. The driver of a motor vehicle traveling
through defiles or canyons or on mountain highways
shall hold such motor vehicle under control and as
near the right-hand edge of the highway as reasonably
possible and, upon approaching any curve where the
view is obstructed within a distance of 200 feet along
the highway, shall give audible warning with the horn
of such motor vehicle.
It is the contention of the defendant that the evidence
in this case does not sustain the verdict of the jury and in
view of the evidence, the defendant should have recovered
on his cross-complaint.

CONCLUSIONS
Defendant respectfully submits that the court should
reverse the decision and find the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and enter judgment
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
NEWEL G. DAINES,
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant.
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